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THE product liability crisis of the mid-1980s has sparked a variety of
efforts to reform the tort system, including studies by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, the American Law Institute, the American Bar Associa-
tion, and others.' The principal impetus for these reform efforts has been
a perceived crisis in insurance markets. Reform efforts have called for
damages caps, restrictions on pain and suffering damages, and similar
measures to reduce the costs of liability. Thus, the dominant perception
is that producers rather than the accident victims are the main victims of
the crisis and that tort liability reform should be directed at diminishing
these effects.
Although this is a prominent view, it is not altogether obvious that the
tripling in product liability insurance premiums in a two-year period in
the mid-1980s reflects a crisis that merits a comprehensive overhaul of the
tort system. Consider the following possible explanations for the crisis.2
* George G. Allen Professor of Economics, Duke University and Associate Reporter,
American Law Institute Project on Compensation and Liability for Product and Process
Injuries. Thomas Dunn and Oren Lewin provided excellent research assistance.
See Tort Policy Working Group, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report on the Causes, Extent,
and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability
(1986); Report of the ABA Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System (1987);
and the American Law Institute, Compensation and Liability for Product and Process
Inquiries (draft final report, 1989).
2 These explanations are articulated in the excellent assessment of the crisis by Kenneth
S. Abraham, The Causes of the Insurance Crisis, in 37 New Directions in Liability Law:
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 54 (Walter Olson ed. 1988). Other assess-
ments of the crisis appear in Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Crisis,
48 Ohio St. L. J. 399 (1987); George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort
Law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521 (1987); Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XX (January 1991)]
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First, the rise in premiums may not reflect an escalation of the product
liability burdens but rather may be simply a consequence of the under-
writing cycle for the insurance industry. In particular, the premiums that
firms receive for insurance are invested and are used to pay off losses
that often occur many years after the premiums are paid. If interest rates
are high, then the premiums that can be charged will be less since the
firms will be able to earn a substantial return on the funds before paying
off any losses. The decline in interest rates in the mid-1980s consequently
forced firms to raise premiums, and to the extent that this influence is
responsible for the higher premiums, there is no crisis in the underlying
liability structure. Europeans were also believed to have withdrawn from
the reinsurance market due to macroeconomic conditions. Thus, some
have argued that the premium shift is in part a consequence of broader
economic fluctuations that lie outside the domain of tort liability reform.
A second possible explanation is that the hike in premiums results from
collusion among insurance firms who are using the rate increase to justify
reform efforts to diminish their insurance costs in the future.
Such explanations betray an overly simplistic view of what the insur-
ance industry is attempting to accomplish. Clearly, in the short run a
reduction in liability costs may benefit insurance companies that have
written policies for which they will have to pay off losses into the future.
However, in the long run the insurance industry will profit from a high
level of liability since that will increase the degree of coverage it can
write. More tort liability generally means more business for the insurance
industry. Collusive behavior that is designed to decrease the amount of
insurance business appears implausible. A third explanation is that the
liability crisis results from an increase in the level of liability burdens. The
increased level could have come from either an increase in the riskiness of
the products being marketed or a change in liability standards.
Finally, a fourth explanation is that the crisis stems from the uncer-
tainty that has been introduced in the tort liability system from changes in
legal doctrine. Highly volatile loss patterns limit the insurance industry's
ability to write coverage. If a policy runs the risk of leading to substantial
insurance payoffs that were unanticipated, as in the case of asbestos,
then the premiums that must be charged will be raised to cover such
future contingencies.
Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 Yale J. Reg. 455 (1988); Michael Trebilcock, The Social
Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Per-
spective on the Product Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 929 (1987); and
Scott Harrington, Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market, in Liability: Perspec-
tives and Policy (Robert Litan & Clifford Winston eds. 1988). These concerns raise more
generally the issue of the role of product liability as an insurance market. See Richard
Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. Legal Stud. 645 (1988).
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At present, there is no consensus regarding the extent to which the
explanations involving the role of the underwriting cycle, conspiracy
among insurance companies, increased liability actions, and uncertainty
have contributed to the product liability crisis. Moreover, how one diag-
noses the tort liability crisis will play a critical role in determining the
direction product liability reform should take, if indeed the tort liability
system is responsible.
The assessment of the tort liability crisis presented in this article will
augment consideration of federal court cases with a detailed analysis of
insurance rate statistics. These insurance data offer the advantage that
they capture the total economic influence of all product liability claims,
not the unrepresentative and small segment of these claims litigated in
federal courts. Moreover, since the data include information for several
years after the prodefendant shift is believed to have begun, they will
reflect the effect of any shift in judicial philosophy.
Sections II and III begin my assessment by focusing on litigation
trends. In particular, these sections document the substantial rise in prod-
uct liability litigation both in absolute terms and as a percentage of all
civil liability actions. Damages amounts have also increased. Section IV
examines the explosive nature of insurance premiums in recent years and
explores the profitability of insurance companies during that period,
which is closely linked to any explanations regarding an insurance indus-
try conspiracy. Although the 1980s marked the most concentrated explo-
sion in premium levels, the premium surge began in the 1970s. The pre-
mium growth in the 1970s exceeded that in the 1980s both in absolute
and in real (that is, inflation-adjusted) terms. To assess the possibility
that an insurance availability crisis has emerged, Section V utilizes the
rate-making files of the insurance issue to explore this. The analysis docu-
ments the shrinking insurance market in the early 1980s that is hidden by
the stability in premium levels. Section VI provides a detailed review of
data pertaining to product liability policies to examine which industries
are hardest hit by product liability costs. Section VII provides the conclu-
sion regarding the legitimacy of the product liability crisis as well as
an assessment of its overall character. There is indeed evidence of a
substantially accelerating liability burden, but excessive attention to the
mid-1980s insurance crisis aspects may have distracted attention from the
more fundamental, long-term problems of product liability.
1I. CONTRADICTIONS OF THE LIABILITY CRISIS
If the liability crisis is to be traced to the tort liability system, there
must have been an increase in product liability litigation or awards gener-
ating this crisis. Although information is not available on a comprehen-
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sive basis for courts at all levels, data are available that permit an assess-
ment of the product liability litigation at the federal court level.'
Table 1 presents statistics on the number of personal injury product
liability cases commenced in federal courts from 1975 to 1987. Examina-
tion of federal litigation trends provides a partial and potentially distorted
view of all product liability claims. The overwhelming majority of claims
are settled out of court, and court cases differ in character from all claims.
Moreover, the mix of claims going to court changes over time. Neverthe-
less, federal litigation trends provide a good starting point for assessing
relative changes in product liability litigation. Over the 1985-87 period,
there was a considerable escalation in the number of personal injury
product liability cases. In 1975 only 2,393 such cases were commenced,
whereas by 1987 the number of such federal court cases rose to 14,145.
For the most part, this increase seems to have occurred outside of the
transportation area. The number of airline product liability cases has held
fairly steady, although the amount fluctuates from year to year depending
on random major catastrophes. Similarly, the number of marine-related
cases is also fairly stable. Motor vehicle cases rose by roughly 50 percent
over the 1975-87 period, but this increase is nowhere near as great as
the more than sixfold rise in product liability cases generally. Although,
as we will see below, much of the increase from other product litigation
stems in part from the rise in asbestos litigation,4 litigation other than
asbestos has increased greatly as well.
5
One plausible explanation for the increase in product liability litigation
is that this increase may reflect an upward trend in litigation generally.
This possibility can be assessed using the statistics in Table 2 on personal
injury product liability cases as a percentage of all federal civil cases.
These data indicate that product liability litigation has become increas-
ingly prominent. Whereas the product liability component of all civil
cases was only 2.04 percent in 1975, by 1987 it had risen to 5.92 percent.
These two comparison years are not in any way unrepresentative, as they
3 There have been a number of examinations of these litigation statistics. The main
difference in the discussion here is that the product liability share of civil litigation is
considered, thus adjusting for the increased litigiousness of society. Other studies include
J. A. Henderson, Jr., & T. Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An
Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479 (1990), and U.S. General Account-
ing Office, Extent of Litigation Explosion in Federal Courts Questioned (Jan. 1988).
4 Available data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts since 1984 and esti-
mated asbestos shares of litigation in earlier years from Terence Dungworth, Product Liabil-
ity and the Business Sector: Litigation Trends in Federal Courts (R-3668-ICJ, RAND Corp.
1988), indicate that the asbestos percentage of all litigation rose from just over I percent in
1975 to over 5 percent by 1987.
5 See data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
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TABLE 1
TRENDS IN PERSONAL INJURY PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS
Motor
Year Total Airline Marine Vehicle Other
1975 2,393 301 46 438 1,608
1976 3,016 160 140 385 2,331
1977 3,366 198 149 372 2,647
1978 3,600 237 139 350 2,874
1979 5,318 699 128 457 4,034
1980 6,876 283 89 535 5,969
1981 8,028 256 69 491 7,212
1982 7,908 374 122 556 6,856
1983 8,026 337 164 574 6,951
1984 7,677 371 133 652 6,521
1985 12,507 278 112 612 11,505
1986 12,459 216 93 656 11,494
1987 14,145 150 99 649 13,247
SouRcE.-Annual reports ofthe director ofthe Administrative Office ofthe U.S. Courts. tables "Prod-
uct Liability Cases Commenced" (1975-87).
TABLE 2
PERSONAL INJURY PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL FEDERAL CIVIL CASES
Motor
Year Total Airline Marine Vehicle Other
1975 2.04 .26 .04 .37 1.37
1976 2.31 .12 .11 .29 1.79
1977 2.58 .15 .11 .29 2.03
1978 2.59 .17 .10 .25 2.06
1979 3.44 .45 .08 .30 2.61
1980 4.07 .17 .05 .32 3.53
1981 4.45 .14 .04 .27 4.00
1982 3.84 .18 .06 .27 3.33
1983 3.32 .14 .07 .24 2.87
1984 2.94 .14 .05 .25 2.50
1985 4.57 .10 .04 .22 4.09
1986 4.89 .08 .04 .26 4.51
1987 5.92 .06 .04 .27 5.54
SOURCE.-MY calculations using data from the annual reports of the director of the Administrative
Office ofthe U.S. Courts, tables "Product Liability Cases Commenced" and "Civil Cases Commenced"
(1985-87).
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reflect the steady upward trend of product liability cases generally as well
as the increased role of product liability among all civil suits.
The airline and marine components of liability cases have had a de-
creasing share, and the motor vehicle share has been relatively flat, if not
declining a bit. In contrast, other cases have been escalating consider-
ably, in part because of the now-substantial share of asbestos litigation,
which constituted 3.25 percent of all civil cases by 1987.6 Other cases,
excluding asbestos and transportation, rose from 1.43 percent to 2.29
percent from 1984 to 1987, so that the increase in litigation for other
products also has been great.
7
What is particularly striking is that both the level of product liability
cases as well as their share of all civil litigation jumped in the 1985-87
period. Since, as we will see below, the tort liability crisis with respect
to insurance premiums emerged in 1985 and 1986, the rate increases that
were observed in the insurance market coincided exactly with the escala-
tion in product liability litigation.
In short, there is evidence at the federal court level of a substantial
increase in product liability litigation, both in absolute terms as well as
in relation to all civil litigation. It may be that society has become more
litigious in recent years, but this increased legal conflict has not been
uniform, as product liability suits have risen more than other civil liti-
gation.
The level of awards in these cases has risen as well. The trend in the
size of product liability verdicts has been upward, for a variety of rea-
sons. First, medical price inflation has driven up the cost of the medical
component of awards.8 Second, increases in worker wage rates due to
inflation as well as real increases in the productivity of the economy have
boosted the size of earnings losses. 9
The upward trend in product liability verdicts has been substantial,
although perhaps not as dramatic as the change in the number of cases
filed. From 1980 to 1987, the average verdict rose from $563,438 to
$1,325,443.1" The median verdict will be less subject to the influence of
large product liability awards, which often happen to be outliers. Never-
theless, even the median verdict exhibited a substantial increase over the
same period, as it rose from $225,000 to $430,000."
6 Id.
Id.
8 For medical price inflation rates, see the Economic Report of the President (1989).
9 Id. at 358, 360.
'0 Jury Verdict Research, Current Award Trends in Personal Injury (1989).
I11ld.
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With litigation on the rise and court awards escalating as well, a natural
inference might be that society is becoming increasingly risky. More spe-
cifically, the products we use are presumably more hazardous since they
are generating considerably more litigation than in the past. Such a con-
clusion is not borne out by the accident statistics, which indicate that
product safety has been improving throughout this century, as have
safety records of all types. 2 Indeed, the only general pattern of an acci-
dent increase of any kind observed in this century has been the rise in
motor vehicle accidents, as society became increasingly accustomed to
using automobiles and driving substantial distances. Even in this case,
accident rates have declined after one takes into account the changing
age structure of the population and the change in the miles driven. 3
The safety trends over the 1977-87 period, which includes the period
in which the product liability crisis emerged, all fail to suggest a source
for this crisis. Accident rates of all kinds declined by 20 percent; motor
vehicle accidents dropped by 11 percent, work accidents declined by 25
percent, and home accidents declined by 26 percent. 4
These statistics reflect a more general economic pattern. As society
has become wealthier, we have demanded greater safety from our prod-
ucts, and as a result the societal risk levels have declined. The tort liabil-
ity crisis cannot be traced to increasing product riskiness, although it no
doubt has been influenced by increased awareness of classes of risks that
formerly were not well understood, such as asbestos risks. However,
even in the case of asbestos it is noteworthy that asbestos exposures in
recent years have been dramatically reduced below the levels that were
responsible for the wave of asbestos lititgation in the courts today.15
Society's increased demand for safety has been reflected not only in the
safety of the products that are sold but also in the actions of government
agencies to promote safety. Beginning in the 1970s, agencies such as the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration took on the responsi-
bility of promoting safety within their various domains.' 6 One would have
'2 National Safety Council. Accident Facts (1988). See also George Priest. Products Lia-
bility Law and the Accident Rate, in Litan & Winston eds., supra note 2.
13 National Safety Council, supra note 12, at 70-71. Mileage alone accounts for most of
the higher accident rates.
14 Id. at 10.
5 The stringent asbestos regulations are reflected in the high costs per life saved. See
John F. Morrall, A Review of the Record, 10 Regulation 30 (1986). Moreover, use of
asbestos was recently banned.
6 The history of the emergence of social regulation is chronicled in Paul MacAvoy, The
Regulated Industries and the Economy (1979).
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expected these new efforts to relieve the tort liability system of some of
the burdens of promoting safety by establishing an alternative institu-
tional mechanism for addressing safety-related concerns.
Instead, what we observe is the opposite result. Safety has improved.
Regulation is greatly expanded. Yet, the role of product liability has also
escalated, even though the problems being addressed by the tort liability
system have diminished as well. The main explanation appears to be that
the current product liability regime is much more stringent than it has
been in the past. This new regime, which has been termed "modern
products liability law" by Richard Epstein 7 and the "new judicial ideol-
ogy of tort law" by Peter Schuck, 18 has shifted the liability standards in
a manner that will increase the liability costs on firms, for any given level
of safety. Some of the consequences of this shfit for insurance markets
and economic costs borne by firms will be explored below.
III. THE RISING ROLE OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION
The rise of product liability litigation can be traced in substantial part
to the surge in asbestos litigation in the 1980s. The relative role of asbes-
tos suits within the set of all personal injury product liability cases at the
federal level is illustrated in Figure 1. " In 1975 virtually all product liabil-
ity cases involved products other than those containing asbestos, as as-
bestos litigation constituted only 2 percent of all product liability litiga-
tion. The asbestos share remained negligible through much of the 1970s,
but by 1981 the asbestos share of all product liability litigation had grown
to one-fifth. Between 1986 and 1987 asbestos took the lead in terms of
the share of all product liability litigation, and by 1987, 55 percent of all
product liability cases in the federal courts were asbestos-related cases.
This figure consequently indicates the fairly dramatic rise of litigation
with respect to a single class of products.
Although the surge in asbestos-related cases has been particularly dra-
matic, the asbestos increase does not account for all of the increased
litigation. Figure 2 summarizes the trends in personal injury product lia-
'7 Richard Epstein, Modem Products Liability Law (1980).
"S Peter Schuck, The New Judicial Ideology of Tort Law, in Olson ed., supra note 2.
at 4.
'9 The asbestos share statistics for 1984-87 are based on actual data reported in the
Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Figures for
asbestos litigation before the statistical year 1984 are estimated values. In particular, the
number of asbestos cases commenced are estimated as .9598 multiplied by the number of
asbestos suits filed, which is a ratio of commenced to filed suits for asbestos for 1984-86.
The share of nonasbestos cases is simply the total number of cases commenced minus the
actual or estimated number of asbestos cases.
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FIGURE I.-Growth in relative share of asbestos and nonasbestos litigation. Sources:
Annual reports of the director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, tables
"Product Liability Cases Commenced" and "Civil Cases Commenced" (1975-87), and
Terence Dungworth, Product Liability and the Business Sector: Litigation Trends in Federal
Courts 36 (R-3668-ICJ, RAND Corp. 1988).
bility cases overall, and it also divides these trends into the share ac-
counted for by asbestos and nonasbestos products. The overall liability
case trend and the asbestos trend display marked increases. The total
product liability caseload grew at an average annual rate of 15.9 percent
over that period, with the greatest breaks in the trend occurring in 1979
and 1985. The asbestos caseload surge also was characterized by two
break points, as both 1980 and 1984 represented shifts in the product
liability caseload trend. Until 1977 there were fewer than 100 asbestos
cases commenced annually, and by 1987 the number of such cases at the
federal level had risen to 7,774.
Although the upward trends for the overall product liability total and
for asbestos are the most dramatic, nonasbestos products displayed an
increase as well. The number of such suits rose from 2,344 in 1975 to
6,371 in 1987, which is an annual growth rate of 8.7 percent. There was
a jump in litigation for nonasbestos products in 1985, which coincided
with the rise in premiums in that year. The tailing off of the number of
nonasbestos product liability cases in 1986 and 1987 may reflect a damp-
ening in such suits as a result of tort liability reforms enacted after the
emergence of the insurance crisis in the mid-1980s.
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FIGURE 2-Case trends for components of liability caseload. Sources: Annual reports of
the director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, tables "Product Liability Cases
Commenced" and "Civil Cases Commenced a (1975-87), and Terence Dungworth, Product
Liability and the Business Sector: Litigation Trends in Federal Courts 36 (R-3668-ICJ,
RAND Corp. 1988).
This comparative stability in recent years for nonasbestos products has
not, however, been sufficient to mute the overall increase that has oc-
curred in product liability litigation. Figure 3 provides a different perspec-
tive on the role of such suits, as it calculates their fraction as a percentage
of all civil cases commenced at the federal level. The civil share of nonas-
bestos products rose from 2 percent in 1975 to 2.7 percent in 1987. The
fact that the nonasbestos share is rising indicates that there has been a
change in the role of product liability. However, it is also noteworthy
that the peak in the level of such cases was 3.5 percent in 1981, so that
there appears to have been some stabilization in the role of product liabil-
ity cases for nonasbestos products, but at a higher level than in earlier
years. In contrast, the asbestos share of litigation continues to be on the
rise, as it increased from 0.04 percent of all civil cases in 1975 to over 3
percent of all civil litigation in 1987. It is the asbestos component of
product liability cases that is the main growth industry segment of this
litigation market and that should be the greatest source of alarm for indi-
viduals assessing the future role of liability.
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lInjury Product Liability Cases Excluding Asbestos. As Percentage Of All Civil Cases
: Asbestos Cases. As Percentage Of All Civil Cases
FIGURE 3.-Trends in product liability components of civil caseload. Sources: Annual
reports of the director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, tables "Product
Liability Cases Commenced" and "Civil Cases Commenced" (1975-87), and Terence
Dungworth, Product Liability and the Business Sector: Litigation Trends in Federal Courts
36 (R-3668-ICJ, RAND Corp. 1988).
The overall potential scale of litigation such as the asbestos suits is
enormous. Although the exact number of disease cases is not known,
what is clear is that there is an increasing amount of litigation, particularly
for job-related exposures.
IV. INSURANCE INDUSTRY TRENDS
Although federal court case counts and selected surveys of jury ver-
dicts provide some insight into the nature of product liability activity,
they abstract from cases not filed in federal courts as well as the value
of out-of-court settlements. An additional measure that one could use to
assess the extent of the change in product liability costs is the trend in
insurance premiums. Fortunately, insurance data are quite extensive over
a long period of time. Examination of the insurance premium data, which
represent the insurance cost to the firm of product liability, reinforces
the impression created by the earlier caseload statistics, and they extend
the time horizon of our focus.
Statistics in Table 3 provide information on trends in general liability
insurance coverage, which includes insurance for ownership of property,
% of all Cil Cases
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TABLE 3
TRENDS IN GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
Percentage of
Net Premiums Annual Real Total
Written Percentage Percentage Insurance.
Year ($ thousands) Change Change All Lines
1958 784,377 . . . 6.24
1959 872,985 + 11.3 +10.5 6.32
1960 974.919 +11.7 +9.8 6.63
1961 1,036,538 +6.3 +5.2 6.83
1962 1,074,076 +3.6 +2.6 6.63
1963 1,106,437 +3.0 +1.6 6.53
1964 1,126,939 +1.9 +.6 6.23
1965 1,153,478 +2.4 +.7 5.82
1966 1,222,539 +6.0 +3.0 5.60
1967 1,345,697 +10.1 +6.8 5.71
1968 1,488,002 +10.6 +6.1 5.77
1969 1,739,589 + 16.9 + 10.9 6.01
1970 2,170,457 +24.8 +18.0 6.66
1971 2,418,737 +11.4 +6.8 6.85
1972 2,590,683 +7.1 +3.8 6.66
1973 2,741,493 +5.8 -. 4 6.52
1974 2,989,837 +9.1 -1.8 6.70
1975 3,085,226 +3.2 -5.4 6.22
1976 4,251,298 +37.8 +30.2 8.07
1977 5,845,075 + 37.5 + 29.2 8.07
1978 6,490,064 +11.0 +3.2 7.95
1979 6,612,474 +1.9 -8.5 7.34
1980 6,414,678 -3.0 -14.5 6.71
1981 6,046,292 -5.7 -14.6 6.09
1982 5,668,459 -6.2 -11.7 5.45
1983 5,679,295 +.2 -2.9 5.21
1984 6,479,268 + 14.1 +9.3 5.48
1985 11,544,152 +78.2 +72.1 8.01
1986 19,364,658 +67.8 +65.6 10.97
1987 20,873,777 +7.8 +4.0 10.80
Percentage of
Net Premiums Annual Real Total
Annual Percentage Percentage Insurance
Average Change Change (Average)
1958-67 1,069,798 +6.2 +4.5 5.95
1967-77 2,932,039 +15.8 +9.1 6.65
1977-87 9,517,312 + 13.6 +6.7 7.40
1958-87 4,506,383 + 12.0 +6.8 6.67
SOURCE.-Economic Report of the President (1989). and A.M. Best Company. Inc.. Best's Aggregates
and Averages, various years. Annual averages and growth rates computed by me.
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manufacturing or contracting, the sale and distribution of products, as
well as professional services. These statistics provide general insight into
the pattern in the product liability area, and in Sections V and VI we will
focus more specifically on the product liability coverage alone.
Examination of the insurance premium data, which represent the insur-
ance cost to the firm of product liability, reinforces the impression created
by the earlier caseload statistics. Moreover, these data extend the time
horizon of our focus so that we can obtain a longer-term perspective
on the period in which the product liability crisis emerged. This longer
perspective is instructive in that it highlights the extent to which the
product liability crisis of the 1980s represents a departure from the long-
run pattern.
The decade 1958-67 was a period of relatively gradual change in terms
of the extent of the liability insurance increase. The total value of general
liability insurance premiums written rose from $0.78 billion to $1.35 bil-
lion. Total premiums increased steadily throughout that period, but the
overall increase was less than double. Nevertheless, the steady increase
in premiums did exceed the rate of inflation in every year, so that there
was a positive real growth rate, as is indicated by the third column of
statistics in Table 3. This growth was comparable to that of other insur-
ance lines, as general liability insurance comprised roughly 6 percent of
the total insurance coverage in 1958 and in 1967.
The next decade marked a dramatic acceleration in the product liability
burden. The total magnitude of general liability insurance premiums writ-
ten from 1968 to 1977 rose from $1.49 billion to $5.85 billion. This increase
represents a more than tripling of the total cost of product liability insur-
ance. During the 1967-77 period the annual growth rate in general liability
insurance was 15.8 percent, with a real growth rate of 9.1 percent. The
growth in premiums consequently outstripped the rate of inflation by over
9 percent. The overall share of the general liability insurance among all
insurance lines also increased from 5.8 percent in 1968 to 8.1 percent in
1977, marking an increase in the role of general liability coverage.
The decade of greatest interest is the period from 1978 to 1987. This
decade marked the period in which the product liability crisis achieved
national prominence.2" The total change in the product liability burden
20 A recent paper by James A. Henderson and Theodore Eisenberg challenges the claim
that doctrines of tort liability continued to evolve in favor of plaintiffs during the 1980s.
See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 3. Henderson and Eisenberg's sample of federal
court cases indicated that beginning in the early 1980s there was an increased percentage
of prodefendant decisions. This development does not necessarily imply that the tort crisis
is abating. Although these decisions could mark a return to an earlier era, they also may
suggest simply that the courts are not pushing the boundaries further in the proplaintiff
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over the course of that decade is similar to what occurred in the previous
decade. What differs is the distribution of the increase across different
years, as it is more concentrated in the 1980s than it was in earlier eras.
Overall, net premiums written tripled from their level of $6.49 billion
in 1978 to $20.87 billion in 1987. What is especially remarkable was the
tremendous concentration of this increase in a two-year period. In partic-
ular, from 1984 to 1985 there was an increase in net premiums written
from $6.48 billion to $11.54 billion. This increase was then followed by a
subsequent rise in net premiums to $19.36 billion in 1986. The view that
a product liability crisis had emerged stemmed from a tripling in the level
of net premiums within a two-year period in the case of the most recent
decade, as compared with the more general spreading of the increase in
earlier decades.
The overall ten-year trend for the most recent decade of statistics was
not, however, historically different from the previous decade. The annual
growth rate in premiums was 13.6 percent from 1977 to 1987, as compared
with 15.8 percent from 1967 to 1977. Moreover, the real increase in premi-
ums, that is the increase adjusting for inflation, was actually less from
1977 to 1987 than in the previous decade. The overall share of all insur-
ance devoted to general liability coverage increased by just under 1 per-
cent in that decade.
The general picture that emerges is that the explosion in product liabil-
ity costs has been underway for two decades, and is not simply a mid-
1980s phenomenon. This timing coincides with the expansion in tort liabil-
ity, which has been a gradual process over the past few decades and was
not concentrated solely in the mid-1980s.
The temporal pattern of the insurance premium trends also is sugges-
tive of which liability doctrines have been of greatest consequence. Al-
though premiums rose in the 1960s, it was the 1970s and 1980s when the
direction. Some expected proplaintiff breakthroughs are not occurring, but this does not
mean that we have reverted to the liability regime of the 1950s. For that to occur, there
must be an overturning of proplaintiff precedents, not simply increased reluctance to give
plaintiffs new areas for court victories.
Some of the evidence cited by Henderson and Eisenberg is mixed. Although the fraction
of defense victories exceeds 50 percent in most of the 1980s, the difference from 50 percent
is not great (the statistical significance of any discrepancy from 0.5 is not clear and is not
reported by the authors). Moreover, although for the decisions of greatest conse-
quence-what Henderson and Eisenberg term "groundbreaking decisions" -there has
been a rise in prodefendant judgments (id. at 511), it is the level of victories, not the
trend, that is of greater consequence. The level of proplaintiffjudgments in ground-breaking
decisions exceeds the level of prodefendant judgments for every year except 1988. Id. at
512. The breakthrough cases have continued to favor plaintiffs, although less so than in the
past, indicating that on balance the pivotal cases remain proplaintiff. The total stock of legal
precedents remains proplaintiff as well.
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greatest escalation in premiums occurred. This timing suggests that it was
not the emergence of strict liability and section 402A of the Restatement
of the Law of Torts that was most influential; rather, it was the develop-
ment of design defect doctrine and the application of defect tests to haz-
ard warnings that were responsible for the greatest increase in product
liability litigation.2 '
The rather uneven performance in the recent decade, however, merits
further discussion. If in fact there was an escalation in the product liabil-
ity burden being generated over the past decades, why was it that insur-
ance premiums held steady and in fact declined in the early 1980s before
escalating rapidly beginning in 1985?
Two explanations appear prominent. The first is that focusing on premi-
ums alone may be a misleading index of the health of the industry. Premi-
ums reflect the net effect of both the price and quantity of insurance sold.
Thus, premiums could hold steady in the situation in which the cost of
insurance has risen and the amount of coverage has declined, which
would be one possible ramification of an escalation in the liability burden.
If this were the case, there would be a crisis in terms of availability of
insurance reflected in the fact that people purchased insurance less and
in some cases were denied coverage altogether. Evidence with respect
to this availability crisis will be presented in the subsequent section and
will indicate that there was in fact an availability problem that is masked
by these relatively flat premium statistics over the 1979-84 period.
Another contributor to premium fluctuations is the influence of changes
in the interest rates. When interest rates are high, firms can charge lower
premiums since they can earn a substantial return on the premiums before
the losses must be paid, which is typically with a several-year lag in the
case of product liability coverage.
During the early 1980s, interest rates were high, and as a result there
was substantial price competition among insurance firms.22 This price
competition lowered the cost of insurance to insurance purchasers. How-
ever, with extreme rate competition in the property and casualty insur-
21 For the history of the development of product liability law, see Richard Epstein, supra
note 2: George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461 (1985): and Marshall
Shapo, The Law of Products Liability (1987).
22 Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Facts: 1983-1984 Property/Casualty Fact
Book (1983). The insurance industry conspiracy explanation is perhaps the least plausible
since it assumes a substantial degree of coordination among the firms, which is difficult to
achieve. For example, in 1988, 3,800 companies sold property and casualty insurance in
the United States, which does not create a favorable environment for a rate-making conspir-
acy. The low profits earned by firms in the mid-1980s also suggests that the conspiracy
theory is not sound.
HeinOnline  -- 20 J. Legal Stud. 161 1991
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
ance lines, firms began to experience underwriting deficits whereby the
losses that would occur under policies exceeded the premiums paid. 23
Firms were still able to make a profit on the insurance despite this deficit
through the return they earned on investment income. The ability to
maintain a viable insurance operation of the kind in which total losses
experienced will eventually exceed premiums hinges on being able to
earn a profitable rate of return on the premium investments, which is
necessarily tied to the interest rates. The periods of high interest rates
during the early. 1980s arose from the Reagan administration's economic
policies of large deficits and a tight monetary policy. The result was high
interest rates, such as a 9.6 percent interest rate on three-month Treasury
bills in 1984.24 In 1985, interest rates dropped by over 2 percent, and by
mid-1985 the insurance industry had reached the stage where investment
income failed to offset the underwriting losses so that the softness in the
insurance market was eliminated. 2 5 The insurance industry functioning
shifted from a situation of price competition to one in which firms had to
rely on higher premiums to ensure the viability of their insurance lines,
thus contributing to the dramatic escalation in premiums in 1985. Premi-
ums continued to increase in 1986, which is not unexpected since interest
rates dropped further in that year, as reflected by the 1.5 percent decline
in the Treasury-bill rate from 1985 to 1986. Interest rates held fairly
steady in 1987, as did the premium level.
Although the overall pattern of premiums is consistent with the pattern
of interest rates over that period as well as the role of price competition
during the period of high interest rates, this evidence does not rule out
the possibility that the industry experienced a period of substantial
profitability throughout this hectic swing in premium levels. The rate of
return on net worth earned by the property/casualty insurance industry
indicates that the crisis did indeed affect the profitability of the insurance
industry.26 Two comparison industries of banks and the median for For-
tune 500 U.S. corporations experienced relatively steady, two-digit rates
of return throughout the past decade. In contrast, the returns experienced
in the insurance industry have been quite volatile, reaching as high as
18.1 percent in 1978 and as low as 1.8 percent in 1984. The period of
the early 1980s in which the premium levels were stable because of the
23 Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Facts: 1984-1985 Property/Casualty Fact
Book (1984).
2' Economic Report, supra note 8, at 390.
25 Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Facts: 1985-1986 Property/Casualty Fact
Book (1985).
., Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Facts: Property/Casualty Fact Book (1988).
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substantial price competition were not particularly lucrative, as the an-
nual rates of return were below those in the comparison industries and
below the overall 1978-87 average for the property/casualty insurance
industry. The escalation of premiums in 1985 did not restore profitability
to the industry, and it was only with the premium increase in 1986 that
the rates of return achieved levels comparable to those experienced in
other industries. Overall, the profitability pattern suggests that the prod-
uct liability crisis was in fact a real phenomenon, linked both to the
emerging product liability burden as well as to the temporary fluctuations
in interest rates, which in turn generated price competition in the indus-
try. The low profitability of the insurance industry in the early 1980s is
not the kind of pattern one would expect if firms were colluding in an
effort to alter premiums in a profit-maximizing fashion.
V. ROOTS OF THE LIABILITY CRISIS, 1980-84
One can obtain a more detailed perspective on the economic conditions
underlying the liability crisis by analyzing irsurance industry data devel-
oped for rate-making purposes for product liability insurance. This infor-
mation, which has never been previously published or discussed in the
literature, is gathered by the Insurance Services Office to advise compa-
nies on the risks associated with various kinds of product liability cover-
age. These data do not include all coverage related to product liability
but nevertheless do provide a useful statistical base for analyzing insur-
ance rate trends in detail. The data base includes information on over
60,000 policies per year over the five-year period, with total premiums
for bodily injury and property damage coverage of over $500,000,000 in
each year. Thus, these data provide a substantial sample from which one
can make judgments regarding the performance and incidence of product
liability coverage.
Table 4 presents overall national statistics for product liability, where
panel A of the table pertains to bodily injury data and panel B pertains
to property damage insurance. In each case, the table provides informa-
tion on premiums, claims, losses, loss amounts per claim, and the loss
ratio (that is, the ratio of losses to premiums). This information is pro-
vided not only for each year, but the table also includes annual growth
rates as well as the five-year changes in these magnitudes.
Consider first the pattern of premiums, which exhibited a downward
decline in Table 3 for general liability insurance coverage more generally.
The same pattern is evidenced in Table 4 for product liability insurance
coverage, as premiums for bodily injury insurance dropped by almost 8
percent from 1980 to 1984, and premiums for property damage dropped
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TABLE 4
PRODUCT LIABILITY TRENDS: NATIONWIDE TOTALS, 1980-84 (Yearly Percentage Growth)
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by over 9 percent. Notwithstanding inflation in the economy, companies
were able to maintain stable premiums by engaging in "cash-flow" under-
writing; companies were willing to take losses with respect to the premi-
ums and payouts for any particular policy in order to reap the returns
associated with investing these premiums. The decline in premiums does
not enable us to ascertain whether this drop was solely a result of price
competition or whether there was also a drop in insurance coverage. We
will explore this insurance availability issue in much greater detail below,
as the evidence will indicate that the premium drop is not necessarily an
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index of industry good health. The final noteworthy aspect of the pre-
mium levels is that bodily injury coverage tends to be more expensive
than property damage coverage, as the bodily injury share is roughly one
and one-half times greater than the property damage amount.
Examination of the claims performance of these policies provides a
mixed view. In the case of bodily injury insurance, there is a decline in
claims, losses, and loss amounts per claim over the five-year period. The
year-to-year pattern is uneven so that a conclusion that there is strong
evidence of a declining market may be overly precise, but there is cer-
tainly no evidence in the bodily injury data of an escalation in the liability
burden as reflected in claims, losses, and losses per claim. What should
be emphasized, however, is that there may nevertheless have been an
escalation in the liability costs imposed, but these would not be evidenced
in an increase in the claims-related variables if insurance firms had cut
back their coverage over that time period. Once again, the key to under-
standing whether there is a crisis related to product liability hinges on
whether there has been a change in insurance coverage. In the absence
of such a decline in coverage, the comparatively steady premium levels
provide no evidence of an emerging liability crisis.
The pattern of claims-related variables for property damage are more
in line with what one would expect if a product liability crisis existed.
Claims rose by 23 percent, losses rose by 33 percent, and loss per claim
amounts rose by 8 percent over the five-year period. These increases
may stem in part from the perhaps unrepresentative nature of the 1980
claims levels. Moreover, one would have expected an increase in the loss
amounts and loss per claim amounts simply as a result of inflation. In-
deed, if the loss per claim amounts had simply kept pace with inflation
over that five-year period, then they should have risen by 31 percent, as
opposed to the 8 percent increase that actually occurred. Once again, the
pattern is too stable to be consistent with a scenario in which insurance
is simply playing a constant relative role over time. The decline in the
inflation-adjusted amount of the loss per claim level is an index of the
likely change in the composition of the risks being insured.
The final component in each of the sets of data in Table 4 is the loss
ratio, which is the key index of insurance industry profitability, as it
provides the ratio of losses to premiums. If one abstracts from the lag
before the losses must be paid, then a loss ratio below 1.0 is essential for
insurance to be viable. With a typical level of 20 percent of premiums
going to various insurance-related expenses such as marketing, insurance
industry operations, claims settlement costs, and normal profits, one
would expect that firms should find it difficult to maintain loss ratios
below 1.0, unless the lag before losses must be paid is great.
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What we find is that particularly in the case of bodily injury coverage,
loss ratios are quite high, averaging .91 over the five-year period and
reaching a high of 1.03 in 1983. What this final statistic indicates is that,
if one excludes the influence of all administrative costs as well as interest
earned on premiums, from an underwriting standpoint the insurance in-
dustry will be paying out more in terms of losses than it has taken in
through premiums. Such as situation cannot be viable in the long run if
interest rates decline. In the 1985-86 period such an interest rate drop
occurred, leading to a dramatic escalation in premiums.
The loss ratios for property damage coverage are lower than those for
bodily injury, but they represent a much more dramatic rate of change,
as these loss ratios increased by 46 percent over the five-year period.
Overall, there is a substantial narrowing of the loss ratios for the two sets
of coverage, as the loss ratio for bodily injury coverage exceeded that
for property damage coverage by .39 in 1980, and the gap was reduced
to .13 by 1984. This narrowing is exactly what one would expect in a
competitive market. If the distribution of losses over time of all types of
coverage is the same, then in a competitive market firms should equalize
the loss ratios across different kinds of coverage to ensure their equal
profitability. The narrowing of the loss ratios is consistent with such an
economic effect.
Overall, the data in Table 4 send more gradual signals of alarm than
the statistics considered earlier. The liability crisis did not stem from an
emerging pattern of escalalting claims and losses, as these were appar-
ently kept under control by restrictions in coverage. The loss ratios
reached alarmingly high levels that could not be sustained in the long
run, and the declining premium amounts indicated an underlying difficulty
with the product liability insurance market more generally. In particular,
in a situation in which the economy was expanding, as gross national
product (GNP) increased by 47 percent over the 1980-84 period, 27 what
we have is a product liability insurance pattern in which premiums de-
clined by almost 10 percent. Relative to the pattern displayed by the
economy at large, which is the basis for what is to be insured by the
industry, premiums should have increased by roughly 60 percent more
than they did over the 1980-85 period. The comparative stability that is
observed in this situation is a signal of an industry that is in fact in
turmoil.
Although the 1985-86 period marked the emergence of the product
liability crisis in terms of premium levels, there was an earlier manifesta-
tion of the presence of a liability crisis with respect to availability. A
27 Economic Report, supra note 8, at 308.
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rational insurance firm will deny product liability coverage in situations
in which risks cannot be effectively pooled and spread or where risks are
highly unpredictable. Although no precise measure exists of the number
of situations in which coverage was denied, and indeed one might not
even wish to pose the question in exactly this manner since one would
want to know whether it was denied at a particular price, we can establish
the extent to which firms chose to exit the market for product liability
insurance.
One would expect as time went on that there would be an increase in
the exposure level (that is, the level of risks covered) associated with a
particular policy. In most instances the exposure level is the dollar vol-
ume of product sales insured, and in a growing economy one would ex-
pect there to be a rise in exposure levels if the role of insurance is con-
stant. Table 5 presents exposure statistics with respect to industries
experiencing different patterns of exposure, and it also provides informa-
tion on the share of total premiums in each exposure group. In each case,
industries are divided into two categories. The first consists of industries
that experienced a drop in exposure over the five-year period, which is
a very strong test for a decline in availability since one would have ex-
pected a substantial increase in exposure in that time period. Although
the dominant unit used to measure the level of exposure is the dollar
volume of sales covered by insurance, in some cases physical units are
used instead. Since exposure units are not always comparable across all
industries, the procedure that I used was to analyze which industries
increased their insurance coverage and which did not.
The results in Table 5 provide for several breakdowns for several types
of product liability insurance. Results for both bodily injury and property
damage coverage are provided, and in each case results are reported for
monoline coverage (that is, coverage for only product liability) as well as
multiline coverage (that is, product liability coverage that is part of a
broader insurance policy). The patterns in Table 5 are quite consistent
with a belief that there was a crisis in availability in the early 1980s.
Whereas one would have expected insurance to dramatically increase, in
many cases it did not. For overall bodily injury coverage, 41 percent of
all industries representing 44 percent of all premiums experienced a de-
crease in exposure levels over that period. This pattern is especially strik-
ing in the case of multiline bodily injury coverage, for which 67 percent
of all industries and 75 percent of all premiums reflected a decrease in
exposure levels. There appears to have been less of a problem with re-
spect to decreased exposure in the case of property damage, as only 19
percent of all industries and 21 percent of all premiums experienced a
decrease in exposure, which is roughly half of the decrease amount that
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TABLE 5
CHANGE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE EXPOSURE LEVELS, 1980-84
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
PERCENTAGE OF 1980 PREMIUMS WITH
INDUSTRIES WITH FIVE- FIVE-YEAR PERCENT-
YEAR PERCENTAGE AGE CHANGE IN
CHANGE IN EXPOSURE EXPOSURE
INSURANCE LINE <0 =>0 <0 0
Bodily injury:
Multiline 66.8 33.3 74.6 25.4
Monoline 20.9 79.1 31.1 68.9
Total 41.3 58.7 43.7 56.3
Property damage:
Multiline 37.1 62.9 30.6 69.4
Monoline 64.9 35.1 72.8 27.2
Total 18.9 81.1 20.9 79.1
was observed in the case of bodily injury. Nevertheless, in the case of
monoline property damage coverage for policies addressing solely prod-
uct liability concerns, 65 percent of all industries and 73 percent of all
premiums experienced a decrease in exposure.
In a period in which there was substantial growth in the dollar value
of the GNP, which was spurred in part by inflation, one would have
expected the level of exposure to increase dramatically as well since this
exposure level is tied to the dollar value of sales in most cases. Instead,
what we have is a situation in which there are often dramatic declines in
the level of exposure affecting substantial segments of the market and,
for some classes of coverage, affecting the majority of industries and the
majority of premiums involved. This is an extremely strong test of insur-
ance availability since the absence of growth and the presence of declines
in the dollar value of exposure represent a striking gap from what should
have been expected in a normally functioning market in which there
should have been very substantial expansion.
What these exposure results suggest is that the relative stability and
slight declines of premiums should not be viewed as a sign of comparative
industry health. We do not have an insurance market in which premium
stability has been maintained solely through price competition. Rather,
there has been an important and dramatic drop in the quality of insurance
purchased in many sectors that indicates that there is a legitimate avail-
ability issue in this market.
On a national basis, premiums held fairly steady or declined, which
represented a substantial drop in the real value of the insurance market.
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Perhaps the main evidence with respect to price competition is how prices
changed in relationship to losses that were experienced. As the data in
Table 4 indicate, the surge in loss ratios in 1982 and 1983 reflects a failure
of insurance prices to keep pace with the losses, which is the pattern one
would expect with greater price competition. Thus, we have a highly
changing market in terms of the mix of firms purchasing insurance. These
shifts in the composition of insurance purchasers are much greater than
the pattern of loss ratios suggests since loss ratios reflect only the rela-
tionship between losses and premiums charged, which should be constant
over time if there were no fluctuation in interest rates. In a market situa-
tion in which demand for insurance was expanding due to the growing
GNP, and the price of insurance as measured by the inverse of the loss
ratio was not rising on a national basis, one would have expected there
to be a dramatic increase in insurance premiums. The fact that there was
not such an increase suggests that there was an insurance availability
problem or, at the very least, that the price competition varied substan-
tially in different insurance contexts.
VI. THE INDUSTRIAL INCIDENCE OF PRODUCT LIABILITY COSTS
The role of product liability costs varies substantially across different
industries. Table 6 summarizes the distribution of premiums by industry
sector as well as by two-digit industry, where these statistics represent
averages over 1980-84. Although one may generally view product liabil-
ity in terms of consumer products subject to defects, in fact this is not
the main orientation of the premium distribution. Just under half of all
bodily injury premiums are for manufacturing, and the great majority of
these products, such as the major categories of fabricated metals and
industrial machinery and equipment, are not consumer items. The leading
two-digit industry in Table 6, miscellaneous manufacturing industries,
does, however, consist of a large variety of risky consumer products,
including sporting goods, toys, lighters, matches, games, and Christmas
trees. However, products in this group are by no means responsible for
the preponderance of all product liability premiums.
Perhaps the most surprising pattern is the prominence of the construc-
tion industry, which accounts for over 21 percent of premiums directly
and an additional 2.6 percent through the building materials and garden
supplies component. One-fourth of all product liability premiums are di-
rectly related to construction, and many others will also have a construc-
tion-related component.
In addition, products used in production contexts also have a promi-
nent share of the product liability burden. Durable goods and wholesale
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INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCT LIABILITY PREMIUMS, 1980-84
SIC
Number Industry






13 Oil and gas extraction
14 Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels
Construction
15 General building contractors
16 Heavy construction except building
17 Special trade contractors
19 Firearms and ammunition
Manufacturing
20 Food and kindred products
21 Tobacco products
22 Textile mill products
23 Apparel and other textile products
24 Lumber and wood products
25 Furniture and fixtures
26 Paper and allied products
28 Chemicals and allied products
29 Petroleum and coal products
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics
products
31 Leather and leather products
32 Stone, clay, and glass products
33 Primary metal industries
34 Fabricated metal products
35 Industrial machinery and equipment
36 Electronic and other electric
equipment
37 Transportation equipment
38 Instruments and related products
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing indus-
tries
Transportation and public utilities
42 Trucking and warehousing
44 Water transportation
47 Transportation services





52 Building materials and garden supplies
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TABLE 6 (Continued)
Premium Share Premium Share
SIC Bodily Injury Bodily Injury
Number Industry (Percentage) (Percentage)
54 Food stores 1.42 .57
55 Automotive dealers and service sta-
tions .30 .17
56 Apparel and accessory stores .40 .16
57 Furniture and home-furnishing stores .56 .64
58 Eating and drinking places 5.19 1.89
59 Miscellaneous retail 3.57 3.41
Services 2.24 2.18
70 Hotels and other lodging places .34 .11
72 Personal services .02 .02
73 Business services .25 .34
75 Auto repair, services, and parking .32 .26
76 Miscellaneous repair services .20 .37
79 Amusement and recreation services .00 .00
80 Health services .06 .03
86 Membership organizations .19 .15
89 Services, not elsewhere classified .86 .90
99 Nonclassifiable establishments .36 .28
trade, industrial machinery, fabricated metals, electronic equipment,
transportation equipment, and related groups make up a substantial por-
tion of the premium share.
The absence of a dominant consumer orientation is also reflected even
more strongly in the case of the property damage results, which indicate
a much greater orientation toward construction and business-related
product liability costs. Although this differential for bodily injury and
property damage is expected, the overall extent of the orientation away
from retail consumer products and services is particularly striking.
In a competitive market, insurance firms should attempt to equalize
the prices they charge for any given amount of coverage so that the loss
ratios experienced in different industries will be equal. This equalization
is difficult to achieve in practice because of the highly volatile nature of
the losses that may be experienced under the policies. Despite the fact
that the industry groups considered are fairly aggregative and the statis-
tics have been averaged over 1980-84, there is substantial variation in
the loss ratios, as is indicated by the two columns of statistics in Table
7. Many quite prominent industries have loss ratios in excess of 1.0,
including miscellaneous manufacturing products, paper and allied prod-
ucts, and chemicals. At the other extreme, many industry groups have
extremely low loss ratios, as is true throughout the construction industry
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PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE Loss RATIOS BY INDUSTRY, 1980-84
SIC
NUMBER INDUSTRY






Oil and gas extraction
Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels
Construction
General building contractors




Food and kindred products
Tobacco products
Textile mill products
Apparel and other textile products
Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Paper and allied products
Chemicals and allied products
Petroleum and coal products
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products
Leather and leather products
Stone, clay, and glass products
Primary metal industries
Fabricated metal products
Industrial machinery and equipment
Electronic and other electric equipment
Transportation equipment
Instruments and related products
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries









Building materials and garden supplies
General merchandise stores
Food stores
Automotive dealers and service stations
























































NUMBER INDUSTRY Injury Damage
57 Furniture and home-furnishing stores .58 .40
58 Eating and drinking places .42 .09
59 Miscellaneous retail .71 .60
Services .79 .50
70 Hotels and other lodging places .59 1.08
72 Personal services 1.04 .13
73 Business services .84 .68
75 Auto repair, services, and parking .84 1.06
76 Miscellaneous repair services .38 .23
79 Amusement and recreation services .57 .04
80 Health services .26 .05
86 Membership organizations 1.12 .21
89 Services, not elsewhere classified .89 .38
99 Nonclassifiable establishments .25 .02
and the mining industry in the case of bodily injury coverage. Because
these loss ratios may be highly volatile, one should not necessarily con-
clude that there are substantial inequities of insurance pricing. What these
statistics do highlight is the considerable uncertainty that is present in
the insurance industry, as the information that is presented in this table
is the primary information used by the Insurance Services Office for rate-
making advice to the industry.
To obtain a more precise assessment of the performance of the market
for product liability insurance, it is helpful to examine in detail the critical
measures of insurance industry operation for selected industries. Table 8
presents such results on a year-by-year basis for the narrowly defined
industry groups (five-digit level) that had the largest premiums in 1980
for bodily injury coverage and property damage coverage.
Many of the most prominent industries in terms of premiums are con-
struction related, including carpentry for detached residences, general
contracting-building construction, and plumbing-pipe fitting.
A particularly interesting set of results is for carpentry. The quantity
of insurance purchased declined dramatically in 1982 and 1984 for both
bodily injury and property damage coverage, as indicated by the drop in
exposure levels in those years. This exposure level drop in turn was
reflected at least to some extent in premiums, but the premium impact
was not as great as the exposure decline because of the role of rising
insurance prices, as reflected by the premium per exposure amount. One
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CHANGES IN INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR PRODUCTS WITH FIVE LARGEST PREMIUMS IN 1980
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
A. Bodily injury coverage:
Miscellaneous services and manufac-
turing:
Percentage change in exposure N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Percentage change in premiums N.A. -4.64 - 11.73 3.84 20.46
Premiums per exposure N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Loss per exposure N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Loss ratio 1.40 1.17 1.48 1.63 1.36
Carpentry for detached residences:
Percentage change in exposure N.A. 7.16 -57.86 18.86 181.15
Percentage change in premiums N.A. -17.92 -27.62 -5.75 11.71
Premiums per exposure .51 .39 .67 .53 .73
Loss per exposure .32 .36 .75 .69 .80
Loss ratio .63 .92 1.13 1.31 1.10
Restaurants:
Percentage change in exposure N.A. -98.37 -97.89 -53.24 -97.85
Percentage change in premiums N.A. -24.55 -83.66 -68.98 -98.68
Premiums per exposure .00 .11 .82 .55 .34
Loss per exposure .00 .02 .51 .10 .04
Loss ratio .27 .22 .62 .19 .11
General contracting-building con-
struction:
Percentage change in exposure N.A. -37.59 16.12 6.61 29.24
Percentage change in premiums N.A. -29.77 11.32 4.30 29.14
Premiums per exposure .30 .34 .26 .25 .25
Loss per exposure .59 .20 .06 .11 .08
Loss ratio 1.96 .58 .23 .45 .32
Miscellaneous wholesalers-durable
goods:
Percentage change in exposure N.A. 2.79 1.80 13.82 17.61
Percentage change in premiums N.A. -7.45 .12 12.01 19.76
Premiums per exposure .34 .30 .30 .30 .30
Loss per exposure .12 .15 .22 .16 .18
Loss ratio .37 .51 .75 .53 .62
B. Property damage coverage:
Miscellaneous services and manufac-
turing:
Percentage change in exposure N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Percentage change in premiums N.A. .16 -11.34 2.33 27.41
Premiums per exposure N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Loss per exposure N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Loss ratio .80 1.26 1.09 1.07 .74
Carpentry for detached residences:
Percentage change in exposure N.A. 7.18 -57.39 23.73 -175.95
Percentage change in premiums N.A. -14.40 -28.11 -3.83 -. 72
Premiums per exposure .30 .24 .41 .32 .42
Loss per exposure .07 .09 .27 .16 .12
Loss ratio .22 .39 .67 .51 .29
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TABLE 8 (Continued)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
General contracting-building con-
struction:
Percentage change in exposure N.A. -21.62 -1.49 6.64 35.67
Percentage change in premiums N.A. -4.89 -1.91 -3.51 -. 67
Premiums per exposure .38 .46 .46 .41 .30
Loss per exposure .29 .35 .43 .29 .26
Loss ratio .69 .83 1.01 .72 .72
Miscellaneous wholesalers-durable
goods:
Percentage change in exposure N.A. 6.53 1.60 15.19 17.07
Percentage change in premiums N.A. 7.04 2.58 7.89 6.72
Premiums per exposure .42 .42 .43 .40 .36
Loss per exposure .29 .35 .43 .29 .26
Loss ratio .69 .83 1.01 .72 .72
Plumbing-pipe fitting:
Percentage change in exposure N.A. -42.37 -14.61 -7.18 -1.60
Percentage change in premiums N.A. -6.98 -21.41 -13.74 -13.97
Premiums per exposure .81 1.30 1.20 1.11 .97
Loss per exposure .26 .59 .87 1.10 1.12
Loss ratio .33 .45 .73 .99 1.15
NOTE.-N.A. = not applicable.
would expect in any economic market that as the price rises the quantity
purchased will decline, and that is what in fact happened in the carpentry
industry segment. It should be noted that the shift in premium per expo-
sure levels was accompanied by a comparable movement in the loss per
exposure levels so that the price fluctuations that did occur reflected the
underlying risks generated by the particular firms receiving coverage.
In some instances, both expansions and contractions in the market are
observed. In the case of bodily injury coverage for general contract-
ing-building construction, exposure levels and premiums dropped in
1981, but there was a resurgence of the market in later years. In this
market the decline followed a rise in the prices as reflected by the higher
premium per exposure amount, and the expansion coincided with a de-
cline and then a steadying of the price.
The industry displaying the most vigorous expansion throughout the.
period is that of miscellaneous wholesalers-durable goods, which had
increasing exposure and premium levels for both bodily injury and prop-
erty damage coverage. In each case, the price of insurance as measured
by the premium per exposure level remained steady. Relative to other
rising prices in the economy, the real price of insurance actually declined,
thus fostering a demand for additional coverage in an expanding econ-
omy.
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Such patterns suggest that there is indeed an availability crisis, but the
character of the crisis does not appear to be that dissimilar from the
functioning of other economic markets. In particular, as the price of in-
surance rises, the quantity purchased will decline. Moreover, in situa-
tions in which the prices have escalated, the loss structure has changed
similarly so that the relationship between premiums and losses has been
maintained. Since the overall national statistics indicate high and, in some
cases, increasing loss ratios in the 1980-84 period in which insurance
coverage dropped substantially, the price increases do not appear to be
arbitrary but instead appear to have been generated at least in part
through the influence of the changing legal structure for product liability
insurance. Indeed, the very high loss ratios that were experienced were
evidence of substantial price competition brought about by high interest
rates. Price competition did not imply lower prices that would ensure a
growing market for insurance. However, this price competition did lead
to a situation where the overall premiums received often did not exceed
the total value of the losses experienced.
VII. CONCLUSION
Examination of a variety of sources of statistics indicates that the prod-
uct liability crisis is real, and it is not simply imagined or contrived by the
insurance industry. Litigation in the product liability area has escalated
dramatically, but to some extent the industry was able to mute the effect
of this escalation because of the influence of rising interest rates in the
early 1980s as well as because the shrinking market for product liability
insurance masked much of the explosion that was occurring in terms of
the costs of product liability coverage. The dominant pattern in the early
1980s was one of a disappearing insurance market. This phenomenon
prompted many public accounts of a crisis in availability, which were
often accompanied by case studies of, for example, day-care centers or
municipal playgrounds that were denied liability coverage.
Once interest rates began to decline in the mid-1980s, it became essen-
tial for insurance companies to raise the price of insurance to establish
a better relationship between losses and premiums. The escalation in
premiums that took place did not mark the advent of a liability crisis but
simply a different manifestation of an ongoing crisis. In particular, there
was a crisis in availability experienced in the first half of the 1980s, and
a crisis in terms of escalating prices that emerged in 1985. Each of these
phenomena was generated by the dramatic growth in the liability burden.
This escalation in the cost of liability and the level of litigation more
generally has not been restricted to the 1980s but has been the result of
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a longer-term shift in the role of product liability in American society.
These shifts have had a profound effect on the product liability insurance
market, which is but the most visible symptom of the widespread eco-
nomic ramifications of the changing role of tort liability. Although the
greatest surge in litigation has been for asbestos-related claims, other
product liability litigation has risen as well. The market evidence in no
way implies that earlier liability regimes were superior to the more costly
liability regime now in place, but they do suggest that there has been
a sufficiently fundamental shift in the effect of liability that a careful
reexamination of its functions is warranted.
The timing of the expansion in insurance premiums also indicates the
major sources of the higher litigation rates. Although premiums rose in
the 1960s, the greatest expansion occurred in the 1970s and to a somewhat
lesser extent in the 1980s. This pattern suggests that it is the role of
product defect doctrine and hazard warnings cases rather than the adop-
tion of strict liability that has led to the urgency with respect to the need
for product liability reform.
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